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Abstract
The Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) of the EU is included within the
new maritime policy initiatives arisen in the last years both in developed and
developing countries. This article claims that these initiatives are the respon-
se to the new challenges in the oceanic domain. The IMP is the European
answer to the new oceanic order. In the global context, the IMP competes
with other emerging countries with dynamic economies, whose competitive-
ness rests on not so rigorous social and environmental standards. On the
other hand, this article underlines the importance of maritime policies for
security, as they contribute to a better governance of the oceanic domain
which, to a great extent, falls outside the jurisdiction of the States.
Introduction
At a global scale, oceans are attaining an ever growing protagonist role in
the political agenda, although not yet proportional to the overall importance
of marine basins in the world and to the nature of environmental conflicts.
These circumstances roughly coincide with the turn of the century, which
could therefore be taken as the milestone which separates two visions or
concepts of the oceans. The old paradigm connected with the geographic
discoveries, the establishment of colonial empires, and the alliance between
commerce and naval powers is giving way to a model based on competitive-
ness, innovation and knowledge. This new vision implies a loss of strategic
interest in the traditional activities and a shift towards new technologies,
energy security and global leadership (Fig. 1).
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In this context take place, and are to be understood, the few but important
initiatives undertaken by various States, both developed and developing, from
the beginning of the 90’s and more extensively since 2000. (Fig. 2). The initia-
tives are wide-ranging: new strategic visions, development of policies or new
ocean laws with an integrating spin, or the establishment of new institutions
for the development of integrated governance. In general terms, these strate-
gic, political, legal and institutional structures are aimed at understanding
the new role of the oceans and the way the States lean on the maritime
domain to face up new world challenges. For the international community,
the last decade of the 20th century —the UNCLOS was implemented in
1994— was the culmination of the modern age of maritime tradition whereby
the oceans are considered as «commons», ruled by the mare liberum principle
and a public action which balances the differences among States. Thus, the
«Area» was declared a common heritage of mankind and the «Authority» and
the «Enterprise» were established. But, in turn, the UNCLOS gave rise to
maritime nationalisms extending jurisdictions and reducing the common
spaces: the high seas and the sea bottom.
Developed countries are shaping a new vision of the oceans different from
the 19th century naval vision; the environment is now a key factor (sustaina-
bility and regulations based on ecosystems), food security is replaced by
energy security, and international leadership is based on innovation, know-
ledge and new technologies rather than on the former naval power-trade
expansion connection. Developing countries, particularly emerging econo-
mies or BRIC countries— Brazil has formulated pioneering political propo-
sals —have developed a traditional maritime thinking (Mahan revisited)
influenced by the huge importance of maritime commerce in their economies,
the enormous size of their port facilities, and the potential of the maritime
territory and its resources (extended continental shelf). Their maritime
project is aimed at making up for past shortages and at the appearance of a
new need: to build up a military naval power.
The European Union, with a maritime dimension of a planetary scale
(economic and territorial) has an intricate network of maritime policies (Fig.
3). Its oceanic strategic vision is being developed by the 2007 Integrated
Maritime Policy, perhaps the most ambitious and most advanced policy in the
international scene, based on a wide variety of EU social and environmental
principles and long range strategic goals. In such an internationalised realm
as the maritime domain, the feasibility of the IMP is determined by European
competitiveness in front of nations with a high birth rate but poor social and
environmental standards.
In this sense, the aim of this article is to offer some IMP perspectives in
relation to: i) The initiatives developed by a growing number of nations;
despite being some commonalities, the different models of economic and poli-
tical development and the geopolitical readjustment of the international
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community create great differences in the construction of these new public
policies - an overview and interpretation of the most relevant policies is
provided. ii) The strengths and weaknesses of the IMP in relation to the goals
sought after and the principles governing it. iii) The environment where the
IMP is to be implemented, characterised by a deep transformation of the main
political actors and international leadership; the IMP must be confronted
with the oceanic vision of its major competitors, the emerging nations. iv) The
security dimension linked to the IMP; this policy, by its very nature, exceeds
the EU framework and must, demands to be considered across the global
oceans (the high seas and the area) within the context of multilateral coope-
ration. A significant part of the security at a global scale depends on an effec-
tive governance of the oceans, but only a small part of the international
community have the assets to enforce it.
Political initiatives for ocean management: its evolution
The formulation and implementation of marine policies is still a novelty.
Its insertion within the governmental political agenda depends, to a great
extent, on the significance each nation attaches to maritime issues, as well as
the economic relevance of the oceanic resources to their societies and their
geopolitical and geostrategic interests. Although the first oceanic manage-
ment projects date from the late 60’s (1) and early 70’s (appearance of the
integrated approach, environmental concerns, first national and international
agreements —Regional Seas Programme and MARPOL Convention among
other—), it is in the 80’s and 90’s when two main processes take place: the
generation of a new oceanic legal framework (the UNCLOS) and the formu-
lation of new policies according to a new paradigm based on sustainability
and governance (2). From those policies, new political and legal formulae
emerged in leading countries which could be very well deemed as the spear-
head of oceanic governance; these included developed countries (Australia,
Canada, United States) and some emerging nations (basically Brazil, China
and India).
Australia showed as of the early 80’s a deep concern about oceanic mana-
gement issues (3) and in 1998 outlined Australia’s Oceans Policy (4); Cana-
da, however, started with a key judicial instrument: the Oceans Act of 1996
followed by the Oceans Strategy of 2002 (5). The United States has also
shown interest in maritime issues and the management of maritime spaces
(the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 is a case in point) and has
recently passed the Oceans Act of 2000 and a national oceanic policy (6)
which deals with a wide variety of maritime aspects, from management to
conservation of marine resources, pollution, marine science support, commer-
ce, transport and, of course, the US leadership role in oceanic and coastal
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activities (7). The three countries share some interesting aspects. Apart from
their size and, above all, the extensive maritime zones under their respective
jurisdictions, these countries have faced in the last decades many economic
and environmental challenges and an ever growing responsibility in their
maritime spaces. Thus, the environmental protection and the sustainable use
of the ocean, together with the preservation of living marine resources, are
vital motivations for the implementation of national maritime policies. Those
initiatives are complemented by others from economically developed coun-
tries such as New Zeeland (still a project), Japan (the Basic Act on Ocean
Policy of 2007 and Basic Plan on Ocean Policy 2008), or France (Livre bleu.
Stratégie nationale pou la mer et les oceans, 2009) with solid planning and
important legal or institutional support.
In less developed nations, the situations are diverse and heterogeneous.
Some countries enacted laws in the 80’s and 90’s like the South Korean Marine
Development Basic Act of 1987, and the National Marine Policy of the Philippi-
nes in 1994. Other nations have joined the process, not without difficulties (8),
in later dates; examples are the Estrategia Marítima Nacional of Panama
(2004), the Política Nacional del Océano y de los Espacios Costeros of Colom-
bia (2007). The so called emerging countries deserve a special mention, as
early developments appear amongst them (the Política Nacional para os Recur-
sos do Mar of Brazil (1980) and the 1982 Ocean Policy Statement of India).
The EU Integrated Maritime Policy: weaknesses and strengths
The Green Book (2006), the Blue Book (2007) and the Action Plan (2007)
of the IMP establish as the main driving forces for the transformation and
development of the maritime activities the innovation, competitiveness and
knowledge, including aspects such as quality of life in coastal areas, gover-
nance and maritime heritage (Fig 4) within a public policy framework with
the highest social and labour standards among the international community.
The European oceanic vision is, as a consequence, an option that must be
made compatible with the demand for competitiveness (one of the reasons
which triggered the IMP), efficiency, innovation and a profound renovation of
the maritime sector, which is a contradiction in its own terms: globalization
and advanced social practices do not give the impression of being compatible
nowadays. If this approach was questioned when formulated in 2007, the
current financial and economic crisis insinuates new doubts on its feasibility.
The IMP philosophy, tightly connected to innovation, knowledge and techno-
logical developments may result in a paradox: at the same time that those
elements are an opportunity to reactivate and guide our economic sectors
(including new sources of energy), the need for new investments (9) may turn
it unfeasible or, at least, slow it down.
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The EU IMP includes a series of actions (Action Plan) which offer respon-
ses to the great global challenges and their repercussion on the oceans (10).
Most actions are not feasible without substantial investments, and the respon-
ses to the precariousness of the labour market and the degradation of social
policies, such as reinforcing the maritime careers and the creation of new
labour models (and quality employment) in the maritime sector, must be
undertaken in an economic situation dominated by emerging nations. Natio-
nal responses like the ones contained in the French Livre Bleu suggesting a
kind of re-nationalisation of the merchant fleet given the social and environ-
mental degradation of the maritime sector, though part of a broader Europe-
an effort, may have an uncertain outcome. The great challenge of the IMP is
therefore to reconcile the social and environmental principles with the
demand of being competitive in a global scene spurred on new economic,
political and maritime powers.
The IMP within the global context: BRIC nations as emerging maritime
powers
The European Union, thanks to its maritime tradition, economic influence
and extension (around 24 million square kilometers) may be considered a
maritime empire (11), but the global scenario is giving rise to new actors
which challenge its leadership and the very feasibility of the IMP, which will
have to take into account the vision and maritime orientation of the new
competitors.
The so-called emerging nations are playing an important role in the sphe-
re of international relations and the management of the oceanic space. The
needs derived from their high economic growth rates and from the areas of
abject poverty have conditioned the maritime development of these countries.
It is especially noteworthy the case of the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India,
China), which are formulating maritime policies and naval strategies aimed
at facing the new environmental, economic and security challenges in ever
larger jurisdictions.
Except in the case of Russia (12), which will probably try to restore its lost
maritime capability as a great naval power, the other three (Brazil, India and
China), which have already made political formulations applying to the mari-
time spaces, share certain features and try to establish ad-hoc institutions and
rules, and implement policies in the maritime domain which may allow them
to acquire a protagonist role which they are already assuming in economic
and geopolitical issues. In this way, environmental challenges, the protection
of sea lines of communication and the management of offshore resources, are
important goals for the BRICS. The Brazilian Política Nacional para os
Recursos do Mar (amended in 2005) proposed to underline the goal of sustai-
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nability of maritime activities and the attainment of social related objectives
(like job creation), complementing the goals of the Política Marítima Nacio-
nal of 1994 (development of a national maritime culture, rationalization and
profit in maritime activities, environmental protection, and safeguard of
national maritime interests). The current Oceanic Policy of India, on its
part, is also based on the sustainable use of oceanic resources as a way to
benefit society (13). The fourth of these nations, China, has tried to imple-
ment a sustainable marine management regime from the 70’s on, coinciding
with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and the creation of five Special
Economic Zones in the coast. The serious demographic, environmental,
energy (14) and natural disasters prevention problems in the sea-coastal
sphere (which had already pushed for the National Marine Development
Plan, 1994) have increased, and demand new instruments (China Oceans
Agenda 21, White Book on the Development of Chinese Marine Issues) for
efficient responses to economic development needs and improvements in the
quality of life and maritime environmental issues which are dangerously
beginning to get worse.
In any case, it is a fact that the emergence of these powers in the interna-
tional scene will result in a geopolitical and strategic reshuffle, a strong
competition (commercial, industrial, naval) for the traditional powers and
changes in the planning of the IMP. The EU will be forced to compete with
nations where economic challenges and the search for international prestige
have more weight than environmental and social-labour issues (more
“permissiveness” in these two areas may force the EU to ease the conditions
and restructure/adapt its maritime sectors), and where a more naval appro-
ach is growing again; something that the European security arrangements
must take into account (15).
IMP and security
Security is intrinsic to IMP but with different angles; from defence (which
is expressly excluded from this policy (16)) to food security (biodiversity, and
illegal, undeclared or unregulated fishing), but with a vital core around secu-
rity in shipping (European Commission: Third Maritime Safety Package,
2009). All those angles concur in one general action: ocean governance (17).
In this sense, the concept of security is tightly connected with ocean gover-
nance in the sense that power and capability to enforce it determine the feasi-
bility of maritime economy, the wellbeing of the environment, the regenera-
tion of living resources, the exercise of essential rights as free shipping and
the access to overseas areas beyond national waters: rights and duties (States
responsibility in the protection of common spaces) which demand universal
rules to enjoy them and to sanction violators. To govern 40 % of the planet
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(18) made up of seas and oceans is a challenge the international community
must face and is the main goal of maritime policies.
In so far as national maritime policies include all territorial waters of a
State up to the exclusive economic zone or the external limit of its continental
platform beyond 200 miles, they are included within the foreign action of the
State since national rights and the rights of third States concur in those
spaces. For this reason, oceanic issues have traditionally been connected
with the exclusive action of the central State. Although this is being modified
by the political decentralisation process and by an increasing use of the
maritime spaces and their resources (19), the maritime environment is still
being considered as a transition territory (from full sovereignty exercised
overland to a free access space open to all nations) where many challenges
and risks come from. For the European Union and its IMP this circumstance
is considerably worsened since this political entity has the greatest oceanic
projection of all the international community. As a consequence, «… the IMP
cannot be limited to just a European policy» (20). Besides, it is not only a
policy which clearly goes beyond the European continent and extends where
EU nations have jurisdictional waters, but this policy and the EU institutions
have important responsibilities in the governance of spaces outside the natio-
nal jurisdiction. And this is, no doubt, a key security issue: the contribution to
the governance of a large part of the planet (40% of high seas and their
areas). The question of piracy clearly illustrates the reach of one of the issues
that this responsibility should address, but it is not the only one if we keep to
the above mentioned document, where the global oceanic challenges are
dealt with (climate change, biodiversity, marine resources, shipping competi-
tion, naval shipbuilding and work regulations of marine labour force). With
an international community which is mainly set up by States without proper
assets and capabilities to intervene in oceanic issues, the EU is part of the
limited group of political entities which can exercise the necessary governan-
ce of the oceans. The EU leadership and its security are linked to the mariti-
me domain (21).
Maritime policies, as public policies generated and implemented by the
States, have an internal angle —management of spaces and resources under
national sovereignty— but there also exists a foreign angle, since the States
must face the management of wider jurisdictional areas which demands more
responsibilities and obligations with a view to the preservation of resources
and environmental protection, and the security and integrity of such spaces
(which in turn requires more international cooperation). In so far as they are
«foreign policies», maritime policies are drafted and implemented based on
specific values and expectations and they take into account the existing inter-
national reality of each moment. Nowadays, the international political agenda
includes aspects which are ever more complex and interdependent; so much
so that it is impossible to sort out topics like conflicts, security, economic
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globalisation and the transnational progresses so characteristic of the global
agenda (22). The most accepted discourse as regards to international rela-
tions exceeds the state centralised perspective and contemplates trans-border
and global facts (23) (clear examples are marine environmental issues, mana-
gement of migrant living resources, and shipping), incorporating «low poli-
tics» to the agenda (socio-economic issues, environment) although keeping
alive the geopolitical concerns or «high politics» (power distribution, interna-
tional leadership, assets for the control and security of national spaces) and,
of course, the geo-economic concerns. In all likeliness, the current oceanic
policies and strategies are well adapted to such an approach. (Table 1).
Paradoxically, although security and defence issues are not included in the
IMP, it is in those fields were interesting advances are being made. There are
existing examples in the EU like the European Security Strategy (24) where
different institutions and organisations (the Spanish Institute of Strategic
Studies; Naval Warfare College; EU Institute for Security Studies, etc) are
striving to assess the possibilities of implementing specific mechanisms for
protecting the security of spaces and maritime activities; surveillance and
protection missions have already been carried out successfully (ATALANTA
operation). In this way, the ministries of Defence of the EU and their respecti-
ves Naval Staffs are in line with what other naval forces have been doing for
some time (25). In the coming years we may likely witness the formation of, at
least, three main pillars of the European oceanic management: an environ-
mental pillar (Marine Strategy); a political pillar (the IMP itself) and a secu-
rity and defence pillar (a naval security strategy?; an enhancement and
reorientation of EUROMARFOR?) capable of facing wide-ranging tasks such
as the protection of economic and technological flows; environmental protec-
tion; border control operations; or human relief (26) in catastrophes, all in
harmony with a new and broader concept of security (27).
(1) In 1996 the USA passed the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act
which, among others, established the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resour-
ces —or Stratton Commission—. This commission presented in 1969 its well known report Our
Nation and the Sea.
(2) For an assessment of the most recent evolution regarding ocean Management see
Smith (1994) and Vallega (2001 a, 1-20, 2001 b).
(3) This concern appears in legal instruments such as the Offshore Constitutional Settle-
ment (1979) or the Coastal Waters Act (1980).
(4) See Commonwealth of Australia (1998).
(5) See Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2002).
(6) The US oceanic policy Project appears in the report An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st
Century (US Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004; Tibbetts, 2005).
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(7) The Oceans Act establishes the new ocean policy will promote «…the preservation of
the role of the United States as a leader in ocean and coastal activities, and, when it is in the
national interest, the cooperation by the US with other nations and international organizations
in ocean and coastal activities» (Oceans Act of 2000, section 2.8).
(8) The feasibility of any oceanic Management programme or policy must take as it star-
ting point a series of minimum requirements such as political will to undertake that strategy, a
legal framework, sufficient economic-financial assets, social support, qualified technical teams
(and specialized agencies) and appropriate technical-scientific information about the specific
spaces where the policy is going to be applied. It is clear that the first four requisites constitute
a basic environment without which the ocean policy would be unfeasible and unsuccessful.
Unfortunately, in the less developed countries, to the difficulties inherent to the formulation,
design and implementation of ocean policies, other structural deficiencies in legal, institutio-
nal, financial and political practicalities are to be added.
(9) In this sense, it is enlightening the US administration initiative known as Ocean Rese-
arch Priorities Plan de la Joint Ocean Commission (2009) proposes an Ocean Investment Fund
to identify sources of revenue and a budget for the coastal-marine environment.
(10) See Suárez de Vivero, Rodríguez Mateos (2010)
(11) See Suárez de Vivero (2007)
(12) The guidelines of the Russian maritime policy have been recollected in the Maritime
Policy Document of July 2001 (cleared by the President of the Russian Federation, V.V. Putin,
Nº Pr-1387).
(13) The opportunities that the sea offer for economic development and the need to extend
coastal management proceedings further into the high seas brought about the so called Ocean
Policy Statement of 1982. This document is based on the idea that the use of living and non-
living marine resources must be done in a sustainable way and benefiting the entire society.
(14) Most of the Chinese maritime policies try to address the requirements of the Fast and
enormous commercial and industrial growth of Chinese coastal regions since the economic
reforms of the 80’s. Just consider how to satisfy a growing energy demand, which has fostered
the search for fossil fuels underneath the seabed and has favoured specific regulations on the
matter (Regulations concerning the Environmental Protection in the Exploration and Exploita-
tion of Offshore Petroleum, 1983; Mineral Resources Law, 1986, amended 1996, several laws
dealing with the various Chinese maritime jurisdiction in 1992 and 1998). These initiatives in
support of the development of offshore petroleum will also be incorporated into the new Natio-
nal Maritime Development Programme (2001-2010) where the maritime sectors, specially the
oil industry, are starting to be considered pillars of the national economy.
(15) See Severiano Teixeira, N. (2009, 147).
(16) The IMP does not refer to defence and security explicitly. Through the analysis of the
key documents that support its implementation it may be concluded that those who promoted
this policy declined establishing a any sort of guideline or coordination mechanism affecting a
touchy national sovereignty an issue as defence. Notwithstanding this, when addressing topics
such as coordinating the Member States coast guards, establishing the (maritime) borders
surveillance and control, fostering a European maritime transportation space without barriers
(and secure) or promoting the European international leadership in maritime issues (Commis-
sion of the European Communities, 2007), it is quite clear that, one way or another, a more
effective and firm approach to maritime security will be required (Howorth, 2009).
(17) There are different definitions of «governance». Koolman and Bavinck (2005) propo-
se: «Governance is the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve societal
problems and create social opportunities. It includes the formulation and application of princi-
ples guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them». As far as «ocean
governance» is concerned, we could define it as a set of rules, practices and institutions that
interact at all levels to ensure equity and sustainability in the allocation and management of
maritime spaces and resources (Mann Borgese, Baillet, 2001); that is to say, a sort of «govern-
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mental system» which would take into account formal and informal rules, old and new power
structures (both state and other social actors: environmental NGOs, marine resources compa-
nies, maritime labour force, …), efficiency and equity in the exploitation of natural resources,
and mechanisms to resolve conflicts affecting the access to the oceans, more so taking into
account that the problems are more acute when independent actors are involved (Friedheim,
199, 748),
(18) The high seas represent 64.2% of the oceans; the area 59.4%. The high seas cover
roughly 40% of the surface of the Earth. See Suárez de Vivero, Rodríguez Mateos (2007, 199-
200).
(19) See Suárez de Vivero, Rodríguez Mateos, Florido del Corral (2009)
(20) See Commission of the European Communities (2009, 3)
(21) A simple analysis of the major European economic activities related with the seas
(energy production and supply, port activities, maritime traffic, fisheries) helps to understand
that the lack of effective security instruments might cause a greater dependency and the possi-
bility of economic choke , as well as EU alienation in international affairs.
(22) As explained by J. Nye (2003), there is not a unique and straightforward international
agenda, but rather a multidimensional one where three complementary contexts partake: one
where the military might is unipolar and almost hegemonic (which would include naval, defen-
ce and security maritime policies); a second one where the economic power is multipolar (that
is to say, the realm of economic maritime policies and leadership); and a third one where rela-
tions are clearly transnational, beyond governmental control and where power is widespread
amongst different actors (applicable to socio-economic and environmental issues).
(23) As mentioned in the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy
(European Council, 2008).
(24) See European Council (2003).
(25) For the US see Department of the Navy (2007); for Australia see Department of
Defence (2000).
(26) See Ries T. (2009)
(27) A concept of security which, in the maritime environment, has materialised in interna-
tional agreements for the peaceful use of the oceans (Degenhardt, 1985, 221-223), a proposal
for control and reduction of naval weapons (Haydon, 1991), de-nuclearised or de-militarised
areas (Pepper, Jenkins, 1985, 165-167; Glassner, 1990, 108-110; López-Reyes, 1998), and the
fleets functional shift (Barnaby, 1993; Morgan, 1994).
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